and prohibited American slaveholders from selling slaves once in the territories. Slaves sold by Americans in or into the Louisianas, in violation of these laws, received immediate freedom. Knowing the importance of slavery to white Louisianans, Congress nonetheless denied them access to future slave imports from the United States or from abroad, a bold measure designed to destroy the plantation revolution in the lower Mississippi Valley.s The second step to prohibiting slavery in the Louisianas required halting the expansion of American slavery. The House passed a bill "inhibiting the admission of slaves into Louisiana, as well from the United States, as from foreign places," which would have barred American slaveholders from the territories.6 The Senate, however, refused to concur with the House bill and failed to pass its own measure proposing to free all American slaves carried into the Louisianas after one year. The interests of southern slaveholders certainly contributed to the defeat of these two proposals, but another consideration weighed heavily in the final decision allowing American slaveholders access to the Louisianas. The Senate insisted that American slaveholders be permitted to settle in the Louisianas to increase the loyal American population there, providing a counterweight to the disunionist schemes that seemed endemic to the Mississippi Valley.
The same concerns for securing the Louisianas that limited the 1804 restrictions on slavery ultimately forced Congress to allow the laws to expire the following year.7 Expressing their outrage at laws that threatened "the very existence of our country," white Louisianans from St. Louis to New Orleans threatened rebellion, disunion, and reunification with France if Congress insisted on restricting their right to buy and hold slaves.8 In late 1805 Congress quietly admitted that the United States government lacked the power and authority needed to enforce unpopular laws in far-off western territories by failing to renew the most stringent restrictions on slavery. As the events between 1803 and 1805 illustrated, the power to determine the future of slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territories rested with white Louisianans who insisted that sanction for slavery was the price of continued union.
United States government could do if it expected to incorporate the region peacefully into the American Union."l Meriwether Lewis wrote of a more menacing situation to Thomas Jefferson. Upon arriving in Upper Louisiana, Lewis found circulating "a report that the Americans would emancipate their slaves immediately on taking possession of the country." These concerns extended beyond a small slaveholding class, encompassing almost the whole of white society in Upper Louisiana. "There appears to be a general objection not only among the French, but even among the Americans not slaveholders," continued Lewis, "to relinquish the right which they claim relative to slavery in it's [sic] present unqualified form." All of these letters carried an unmistakable message. If the federal government wished to quell discontent and incorporate Upper Louisiana's white inhabitants into the United States, then it must positively affirm their right to "obtain an Unlimited Slavery." Before Congress ever took up a bill for the territorial government of the Louisianas, white Upper Louisianans demanded that sanction for slavery be included in the terms of union.l2
Even more than their counterparts to the north, white Louisianans tied their future economic prosperity to unimpeded access to slave labor.'3 Daniel Clark, who acted as consul for the United States government at New Orleans, provided a detailed account of the importance of slave-produced staples in the lower Mississippi Valley to Secretary of State James Madison. The value of the "Casks of Melasses" and "Casks of Sugar" produced by Louisiana slaves was exceeded only by the "20.000 Bales of Cotton," with the quantity of all "annually increasing." Clark also noted that extensive sugar lands, held under French and Spanish grants, were yet to be cultivated because planters lacked slaves to work them. The Philadelphia Aurora also published letters and accounts detailing the staples produced in the lower Mississippi Valley, among them "coffee, sugar, and tobacco," along with "cotton and silk." As one author pointed out, "the whole of this lower country must be exceedingly favorable to the cultiva- The widely circulated "Description of Louisiana," which Jefferson sent to Congress in November 1803, demonstrated further that Lower Louisiana' s future was tied inextricably to sugar, cotton, and slavery.15 Before the end of 1803, Louisiana's ever increasing slave population had already produced "20,000 bales of cotton ... increasing," "45,000 casks of sugar ... increasing," and 80,000 gallons of "molasses ... increasing." Finally, "enterprising young planters" in Orleans estimated "that one-third, or even one half of the arable land" in the lower Mississippi Valley "might be planted in cane." With farmers upriver providing "a regular supply of provisions," the "planter" would be free to "give his attention to" an even "greater body of land cultivated with cane." These letters and reports made clear that planters, using the coerced labor of slaves, were transforming the lower Mississippi Valley into a plantation society that rivaled the Caribbean in both its potential for profit and its insatiable demand for slave labor. As one French observer remarked, the demand for "Negroes is higher in New Orleans than in any other colony": with "so much land to cultivate ... nobody has enough."16 the defeat of the Senate bill the House took up the matter after spending over a week in rancorous debate over South Carolina's reopening of the international slave trade. In March, New Jersey Republican James Sloan introduced an amendment "inhibiting the admission of slaves into Louisiana, as well from the United States, as from foreign places." After Sloan "concisely stated his reasons in favor of this provision," the "question was taken and the amendment agreed to" by the Republicancontrolled House, "ayes 40, noes 36."24 Ultimately, Congress defeated Sloan's proposal for a complete prohibition on the further introduction of slaves because the Senate failed to pass its own bill freeing slaves carried to the territory and then refused to concur with the House bill.25 The defeated attempts to prohibit the further introduction of any slaves into the Louisiana Purchase territories, or to free all slaves at a certain age, illustrate some of the limits of antislavery sentiments in the early republic. Certain congressmen were simply unwilling to vote for a federally sponsored plan of gradual emancipation. However, the Senate's refusal to support stronger measures also reflected concerns about the ability of the United States to retain possession of the Louisianas. More than merely caving in to planter interests, Congress subordinated the desire to restrict slavery to their larger concerns for securing the Louisianas in the now dangerously over-extended republic. For the Senate, the problem of slavery in the Louisianans had to be considered within the context of continued union.
Congressmen and federal officials expected little in the way of loyalty or commitment to the American Union and republican government from white Louisianans. To Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, they "seem[ed] to be but one degree above the French West Indians, than whom a more ignorant and depraved race of civilized men did not exist. Give them slaves and let them speak French (for they cannot write it)," continued Gallatin, "and they would be satisfied." More was at stake than white Louisianans' ignorance and depravity, however. As Daniel Clark remarked in one of his many letters disparaging Louisianans, the "People of this country ... are excessively ignorant," and "may be easily imposed upon" by men bent on disunion. Others dismissed white Louisianans for being "unacquainted with our language, customs, laws, and all the ordinary To counter the potential of western disunion, officials in the West wrote of the importance of encouraging "numerous Americans" to "imigrate to that Country." The Louisianas would "be the source of continual trouble" for the United States so long as the inhabitants were "from all Countries," and "a variety of sentiment and discordant opinion prevails among them." American control of Louisiana remained in peril "untill a Majority of Americans settles in that Country," wrote Thomas Rodney from Natchez. "The American population must be increased," wrote another official, "it must be made to overballance that of every other description of persons. The character, the manners, the language of the country must become American if we wish the Government to be such." The former monarchical subjects of the Louisianas seemed unfit for republican government, incapable of understanding the benefits of the American Union, and therefore especially susceptible to British, Spanish, and French intrigues. 28 Peter Kastor has recently demonstrated that from 1803 through 1815, one of the chief policy objectives of American officials was to "stimulate the loyalty and national identity of white Louisianans." American "officials were convinced that if they failed to cultivate the attachment of white Louisianans, foreign nations might be able to build influence in Louisiana' s population and, eventually, foment a separatist movement or establish allies that would make seizing Louisiana by force an attractive option."29 Efforts to bolster American prestige in the Louisianas involved more than placating white Louisianans. Congress also sought to secure the region further by flooding the Louisianas with "loyal" American settlers who presumably already understood the benefits of the American Union.
This problem forced Congress and federal officials like Albert Gallatin to pass and implement policy in a manner that would rapidly increase the American population in Louisiana. Writing to a federal land agent in Louisiana in 1806, Gallatin conveyed "the wish of the Legislature" that petitions "will be, the opening of the Af'rican Trade," he counseled, "and upon this point, the people in general take a lively Interest." When "these Agents say, that the people generally wish for the African Trade, they will speak correctly." A "rejection of the Memorial would only be regretted by a few Citizens of N. Orleans & its vicinity-unless it respects the African Trade, & on that subject, the people generally, seem greatly interested."46 Claibore's warnings pointed to a larger problem confronting congressmen and other officials concerned with restricting the expansion of slavery. "The people generally," and not just a clique of planter grandees and merchants, demanded uninterrupted access to enslaved black labor. On the Southwest sugar and cotton frontier, all ranks of white society eagerly participated in the "plantation revolution"-a situation similar to that described by Edmund Morgan in early Virginia. But white Louisianans did not look to white indentured servants to address their insatiable labor demands.47 Not surprisingly, the "present inhabitants," the "people generally," the "Citizens," and even the "farmers" of the territory expressed outrage at American restrictions on slavery. The territorial expansion of slavery in the early republic has to be understood within a context of a weak but extended republic, trying to establish its place on a North American continent still contested by hostile European empires and powerful Indian nations. Congress formulated policies that sought to encourage settlement while cementing ties of loyalties with the incredibly diverse European populations in the West. Rapid settlement and development, as well as the ability of the United States to govern effectively, dictated that Congress allow slavery in western territories where the white population demanded it and where the power and authority of the federal government remained weak or contested.63
As a means of resolving the question of slavery's expansion in western territories, a form of "popular sovereignty" figured far more importantly prior to 1819 than after. Federal officials and congressmen recognized that though the federal government enjoyed immense legal authority in western territories, the weak, extended government enjoyed little effective power in the West, where opportunistic European powers actively competed for the allegiance of settlers. Western settlers understood this too, and exploited the federal government's weaknesses by subtly-and at times not so subtly-demanding that legal sanction for slavery was the price of union. So long as federal power remained weak and the potential for western disunionism real, there seemed little that the federal government could do to halt slavery's expansion. Importantly, though Congress failed to place or enforce meaningful restrictions on slavery in the Louisiana Purchase prior to the Missouri Controversy, it never renounced its authority to do so.64 64 Prior to the Missouri Crisis, two congressmen attempted to prohibit the further introduction of slaves to Upper Louisiana. In 1812, with war on the horizon, Abner Lacock of Pennsylvania moved "to prohibit the admission of slaves into the said territory," but the motion mustered only seventeen supporting "ayes"; Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1248. In 1819, during the Missouri Crisis, Republican Senator Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania claimed to have introduced a motion to prohibit the further introduction of slaves into the Missouri Territory in 1811. Roberts asserted that he withdrew his proposal because "we were on the eve of war, with almost one half the community infatuated with the spirit of opposition to the Government." Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., 336-37.
After 1815, American settlers overwhelmed the French and Spanish inhabitants in Missouri in the great migration after the War of 1812, making the territory seem unquestionably "loyal" and part of the perpetual Union. In addition, the emergence of a more powerful federal government in the wake of the Fourteenth Congress, the upswelling of postwar nationalism, and the demonstrated loyalty of western settlers during the war promised to permit effective restriction in Upper Louisiana. Northern Republicans agreed overwhelmingly with James Tallmadge that circumstances now permitted the nation "to halt the growth of slavery west of the Mississippi."65 But in 1819 white westerners no longer had to threaten disunion when the federal government proposed halting slavery's growth. Southern politicians, who retreated into a new defense of slavery and made expansion the sine qua non of continued union, proved more than willing to do their bidding for them. 65 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 2nd sess., 305-11. Even in 1819, Missouri's delegate to Congress mocked Congress's pretensions about its true power in the West. John Scott warned that Tallmadge's amendments would merely "expose the imbecility of the General Government," and "induce the people" of Missouri "to an act of chicanery" to evade the Tallmadge restrictions. In other words, white Missourians did not intend to obey the Tallmadge restrictions even if Congress passed them. Ibid., 1202.
